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calculative rationality, and forces of
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Abstract
A defining feature of planning is that it is informed by sound evidence. An ever more diverse
range of decision support tools is available to help achieve this, a trend that is set to accelerate
along with the rise of Big Data and Smart Cities. At the same time, planning is frequently
requested to improve the urban and environmental outcomes it helps deliver. This research
draws upon intellectual resources from Science and Technology Studies, and empirical data
from actors across the science–policy–practice interface, to analyse critically issues connected
to the design, application and wider effects of calculative practices within planning. It finds that
these practices selectively open up or foreclose discourses and play important political roles
relating to ordering complexity and mitigating professional risk. They are also revealed as
underpinning a stability and certainty within decision making that not only maintains the power
of established calculative agencies but also serves to replicate an ideology of urban form that is
in tension with more normative calls for change. More broadly, the findings help unsettle the
planner and planning policy as the key agent able to change planning outcomes, which is
instead revealed as more contingent on the political, institutional and professional culture, and
the ways human and non-human objects align and combine to create internal stability when
there are external calls for change.
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Planning and calculative
rationality
the intellectual puzzle of some future time will
be to account for the failure rather than the
success of the period in which we have lived .
the prestige accorded to mathematics in eco-
nomics has given it rigor, but, alas, also mor-
tis. (Heilbroner, 1979: 193–198)
The famous quip from a US economist con-
cerning the adverse effects of the rise in pres-
tige of mathematics in economic thought
provides both an initial scene-setting provo-
cation and a need to justify its selection. To
adapt the quote, this paper investigates the
extent to which the rise in prestige of similar
calculative practices in planning has not only
given it rigour, but other side effects, which,
in part, help explain critique of planning out-
comes and the profession more generally.
A defining feature of contemporary pub-
lic policy is that it is informed by rigorous
evidence (Cairney, 2016; Parkhurst, 2017).
This trend has been particularly noticeable
within planning, where long-held Geddesian
practices of ‘survey before plan’ are now
supplemented by a growing focus on gather-
ing data to inform decisions (Faludi and
Waterhout, 2006). Associated with this rise in
scientific knowledge, planners have drawn
upon an ever more diverse range of decision
support systems (DSSs) or decision support
tools (DSTs) to help achieve this goal,
from population projections, to cost-benefit
analyses, to complex traffic models and
beyond. This is set to intensify, as the emer-
gence of ‘Smart Cities’ not only promises that
more data can be captured than before but, if
assimilated effectively, new opportunities will
emerge to enhance evidence-based approaches
(e.g. Batty, 2013; Marvin et al., 2016). We are
also witnessing an explosion in the institu-
tional capacity to count and correlate, which
is generating ‘new hypotheses about the way
the world works and prescriptions for how to
act on that knowledge’ (Jasanoff, 2017: 2).
There is an implicit positivism underlying
much discourse connected to this ‘evidential-
ist’ turn, where better evidence should lead to
better policies and plans, and from there to
better outcomes (Davoudi, 2015).
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However, DSTs do not just bring knowl-
edge to decision makers. A key aspect sup-
porting their wider political value is they
turn subjective or uncertain data into actual
dollar values, specific numbers or precise
lines. These ‘calculative practices’ are associ-
ated with the need to make complex systems,
such as those associated with urban areas,
governable (Miller, 2001, 2008); they pro-
vide a simplified representation of reality
and reveal ‘stories that matter in a field of
infinite happenings’ (Jasanoff, 2017: 2).
Consequently, they play a deeper role under-
pinning decision making by rationally iden-
tifying, delineating and comparing options.
In doing so, they help defend decisions and
play an important role in maintaining trust
in expert decision making (Giddens, 1990).
However, while decision makers have never
had so much scientific knowledge at their
disposal, as the opening quote indicates
there is a widespread dissatisfaction with
outcomes and claims of crises (Florida,
2017; IPCC, 2014).
As a key agency associated with this
agenda, planning frequently receives politi-
cal and public calls for change, notably with
regard to its ‘red-tape’, zoning practices, or
inefficiencies in processing consents (e.g.
Cheshire et al., 2012; HM Treasury, 2015).
In this context, DSTs are seen as a means to
improve rigour, efficiency or outcomes, yet
research emerging from the field of Science
and Technology Studies (STS) is recasting
these objects from an uncritically accepted
part of the solution – a ‘tool’ for users or
‘information deficit’ to be filled – to poten-
tially being a co-constituted part of the
problem. This goes beyond debates concern-
ing the political or value-laden nature of
evidence-based planning (e.g. Davoudi,
2006; Krizek et al., 2009) to its performative
and constitutive power (Callon, 2007).
For example, research in planning reveals
how specific calculative practices, such as
development viability modelling or housing
affordability metrics, do not merely describe
or explain but also shape cognitive structures
and help frame decisions from public and
private actors (David and Halbert, 2014;
McAllister et al., 2013, 2016; Murphy, 2014).
Consequently, DSTs are an intrinsic part of
the assemblage of laws, regulations, culture,
policy and logics that serve to create and sta-
bilise markets (Callon and Muniesa, 2005).
This perspective repositions power and
agency in planning decisions and outcomes
from the usual suspects of policy, planners
or even politicians, to also be epistemological
and relational, to better capture the interplay
between non-human objects and decision
makers. As Callon (1998: 16) argued: ‘if cal-
culations are to be performed and com-
pleted, the agents and goods involved in
these calculations must be disentangled and
framed’. Given the rise of the evidential turn
within planning, this research seeks to take a
critical perspective concerning the selection,
application and wider effects of calculative
practices within planning, including the
kinds of issues they open up or foreclose and
the ways that provide stabilising forces that
are in tension with more normative calls for
change. While the methodology uses a case
study of New Zealand planning to interro-
gate the use of DSTs within a professional
setting and culture, it is anticipated that the
findings will be of interest to others analys-
ing the epistemic turn in urban planning or
the wider critique of the profession.
DSTs are defined as a method or frame-
work that can be used to assist with the ana-
lysis of information required for decision
making or to assist with the decision-making
process itself. The empirical aspects comprise
28 semi-structured interviews, each of which
lasted an average of an hour, and a 3-hour
workshop, all conducted in 2018. The inter-
viewees were identified via a heterogeneous
sampling strategy designed to capture issues
emerging across the science–policy–practice
interface. Three broad areas were identified:
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those who design or develop DSTs (7), such
as modellers or consultants, those who con-
sider the weighting and effects (14), such as
infrastructure experts, planners and
Independent Hearing Commissioners, and
those who consider the outcomes (7), such as
academics, advocates and developers. In
practice, however, a number of participants
had knowledge in multiple areas. The work-
shop was conducted with a local council and
an international consultancy firm who typi-
cally provide data for clients. Attendees
included consultants and council staff spe-
cialised in planning, infrastructure and
urban design who commission, interpret and
weight evidence, and the Chief Executive
Officer. Together, this approach enabled
insights into a wide range of DSTs, as well as
the interplay between technical and legal
issues, and professional and political aspects.
The nature of the New Zealand planning
context and system is also worthy of note.
The Resource Management Act 1991
(RMA) provides the key regulatory frame-
work. In common with many planning sys-
tems, it shares a commitment to evidence-
based policy and decisions, which can be
challenged by opposing parties, contrasted
with other evidence, and subject to expert
and legal scrutiny (Özkundakci et al., 2018).
As will be explained later, another character-
istic it shares with other national planning
systems is significant governmental critique
and wider calls for reform.
An engine not a camera
Planners are expected to commission, com-
pile, integrate and interpret a variety of evi-
dence, whether relating to economic futures,
impact assessments or transport models, and
use this to inform plans and decisions.
Furthermore, other actors concerned with
planning rely upon DSTs, from financial
viability assessments for developers, to envi-
ronmental agencies who map flooding.
There is an air of instrumental rationality
associated with the profession rooted in an
enlightenment perspective of gathering, con-
sidering, deciding and monitoring. The aim
here is not to question the simplicity of this
notional model against the messy political
reality of practice, rather it is to emphasise
the growth of an ‘epistemic culture’ within
planning that warrants critical attention.
There is a burgeoning social science scho-
larship exploring the influence and effects of
science and technology that open up valu-
able spaces of critique for urban planning
scholars and practitioners. One key aspect is
the political utility of data. In a world that is
perceived as fluid, connected and complex,
processes of calculation, classification and
standardisation provide valuable stability
for decision making (Rydin, 2013). Numbers
provide a ‘technology of trust’ and a rational
‘common language’ to justify decisions
(Porter, 1995); responding to the preference
of policy makers for ‘law-like regularities’
(O’Neill, 2001: 487) that help defend poten-
tial legal challenges (Kuhlicke and Demeritt,
2016; Lane, 2014; Özkundakci et al., 2018).
The ability of DSTs to insure against profes-
sional, reputational or institutional risk has
been notably discussed with regard to plan-
ning and natural hazards, where the threat
of future liability is particularly stark
(Haughton and White, 2017; Porter and
Demeritt, 2012). In this regard, Jasanoff
(2012: 3–4) deftly describes calculative rub-
rics, such as risk assessment, as ‘exonerating
discourses’, where the supposedly apolitical
realm of rational assessment and prediction
can provide a degree of political refuge for
decision makers.
A second strand of critique of interest
emphasises that these ‘authorised acts of see-
ing’ (Jasanoff, 2017) are inevitably selective.
Regardless of good practice in model devel-
opment, the development or design of any
information claim involves political choices
(Jasanoff, 2004; Latour, 1999). There are
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hidden logics that influence which public
facts are produced and where reality is
bounded by realities of measurement (Denis
et al., 2006; Jasanoff and Simmet, 2017). As
such, they provide a scientific basis for
ordering types of knowledge. Gieryn (1983)
used the term ‘boundary work’ to describe
ideological attempts to contrast science as a
preferred truth over non-science, or to adopt
the language of science to legitimate ideolo-
gical positions. This issue includes the selec-
tivities of when, where and which DSTs to
use, and for what purpose; all of which can
privilege certain framings and outcomes
(Bell, 1994; Kitchin et al., 2009). There is
also the politics of non-knowledge, as scien-
tific practices of ordering and hierarchy
mean decision makers can over-rely on what
science knows and disregard what science
does not yet know (Jasanoff, 2017).
The ability to recognise and mitigate these
issues can be affected by ‘black boxing’,
which describes how the inner workings of
objects or processes can be rendered opaque,
or too complex to easily understand. This
has implications for scrutiny, as the high
level of expertise required to analyse evi-
dence and adapt to new knowledge objects,
means that non-technical actors may be
excluded. Jasanoff (2017) links the growth in
appeals to science for legitimacy to a culture
requiring high investment in knowledge to
participate. Beyond the more traditional
demarcation between expert and lay knowl-
edge, this issue touches upon capacity, skills,
and the knowledge and resource demands
the epistemic culture places upon local plan-
ning actors (e.g. Ferrari et al., 2011; Rydin,
2007). In these circumstances, information
can acquire a degree of anonymity, yet at the
same time become authoritative and have a
taken-for-grantedness that provides valuable
stability for decision making (Jacobs et al.,
2007). Research also highlights the costs of
‘opening up’ these black boxes, such as the
instability it can create, or the resource
demands in generating technical counter-
claims as a prerequisite of creating new
spaces for negotiation (Rydin, 2013). This
emphasises that as calculative agency is
uneven, so is power. Therefore, those disci-
plines, agencies or issues that have more
knowledge resources, calculative competen-
cies or stable roles within decision making
may wield greater influence.
What this discussion highlights is how the
generation, weighting or application of sci-
ence raises intriguing issues of non-human
agency. STS scholarship usefully adopts the
term ‘actants’ to describe how both human
and non-human entities form associations,
operate in relation to each other and poten-
tially modify the actions of others (Latour,
2004). From a planning perspective, the
notion shifts perspectives away from views
of technology as a ‘resource’ or ‘tool’, or the
power relations of, or between, actors, to
also consider the relations actors have with
objects, such as a DST or plan, and how
these collective relations create outcomes
that may not have otherwise happened
(Callon, 2009). The terminology enables us
to add to the body of knowledge that focuses
on the use of tools or their implicit biases, to
emphasise that they can be bestowed with
power that is useful for decision-making pro-
cesses, as well as practical outcomes. In
short, an STS standpoint argues that non-
human entities can frame problems, modify
behaviour or be enrolled to support agendas.
They co-constitute, align and provide collec-
tive stability. They make a difference.
This is connected to the idea of performa-
tive power, a term that highlights how calcu-
lations do more than record phenomena,
they provoke reactions or change goals
(Callon, 1998). MacKenzie (2006: 16–20)
identifies three increasing levels of performa-
tivity: generic (whether it is used), effective
(whether it has an effect) or Barnesian
(whether its use makes reality more like its
depiction). This third element has a self-
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fulfilling aspect that can make calculations
appear ‘more true’ – they are ‘an engine, not
a camera’. Research focusing on institu-
tional dimensions provides additional
nuance. This emphasises that while all DSTs
have the potential to be performative, their
power is influenced by the culture of deci-
sion making; for example, by the culture of
professions or the institutional and policy
settings, both of which influence the appro-
priate weight and acceptability (Mikes,
2009; Svetlova, 2012). Similarly, a history of
application means their ‘world-making abil-
ity’ matures and crystallises over time
(Christophers, 2014).
Overall, this discussion highlights the
flaws in considering planning decisions as
akin to a ‘rational actor’ model where objec-
tive information from objective tools is
weighted by objective actors. There is no
doubt that incorporating data and informa-
tion within planning decisions is a positive
force to improve the quality of evidence.
Yet, as STS scholarship emphasises, we can
also appreciate that alongside the accepted
benefits of this more epistemic culture there
is a parallel need to apply critical attention
to the sophisticated social relations that
occur between actants. In particular, the
wider political agency that calculations pro-
vide, the selectivities at play, the capacity of
planners to effectively scrutinise informa-
tion, and of real note concerning the inexor-
able rise of data within planning, the
potential performative power over out-




‘Popping heads above parapets’:
The political utility of DSTs
The data revealed recurring themes con-
nected to the political value of DSTs centred
on their ability to mitigate professional and
institutional risk, and provide stability and
trust. While the quote below introduces a
culture most planners would find familiar, it
also provides readers with an insight into
the specific epistemic culture of planning
within New Zealand, where, for example,
calculations hold value in producing quick,
justifiable, and defendable decisions.
[planners are] under the pump, they’ve got
statutory time limits, you don’t want to put
your head above the parapet because it’s going
to take more time and because there’s some-
what of a litigious nature; property values are
high, neighbours can get upset, it’s better to
be more conservative and less innovative .
the whole issue of judicial review hangs over
you because your whole career can be trashed
by one decision . I think a number of planners
that I come across interpret things very strictly.
(Independent Hearing Commissioner 1)
Of particular note is the central positioning
planners and Independent Hearing
Commissioners placed upon defendability,
in particular the way DSTs provide a ‘track
record’ of ‘testable’ evidence, and the per-
ception of professional risk that emergent or
less stable forms of knowledge can bring.
The cautious approach reigns generally .
people don’t want to be ending up in front of
the Environment Court trying to defend some-
thing . you put a lot of emphasis on if it’s
[the model] been tried and tested. (Planner 2)
I think there is inherent conservatism because
there’s a concern, ‘well, if we get cross-examined
or have to give evidence we don’t want to be too
far out there popping our head above the para-
pet in terms of what the modelling is telling us’.
(Independent Hearing Commissioner 3)
The utility of defendability and the perceived
cost of counterclaims also came through
strongly when speaking to developers who
highlighted the extra risks associated with
non-standard development, which they
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argue has helped foster a conservative, stable
culture within the private sector. For exam-
ple, Developers 1 and 2 both saw the social,
environmental and place-making benefits of
building at a higher density but argued that it
was more difficult to get planning consent for
these developments as they were atypical.
Emergent ideas and the associated resource
demands to justify and defend were seen to
carry a degree of avoidable risk for many
private-sector actors, which, while providing
stability, helps to crystallise behaviour over
time.
Do you want to get your consent in this at the
time, or do you want to open up to a bit more
risk where we don’t get consent, or it’s con-
tested? (Workshop Participant)
The development sector, and particularly the
construction sector, is very risk averse.
(Academic 1)
Industry loves to claim that it’s innovative but
it’s never true. They all want to do tomorrow
what they’re doing today. They know how to do
it . They’ll fight against a change in policy first
rather than change their business . We forget
sometimes, we use these models as tools to pre-
vent change from happening. (Advocate 2)
By reflecting upon the recurrence of the
phrase ‘popping heads above parapets’ we
gain insights into the epistemic culture and
the relations between human and non-
human actants. Stakeholders from across
the science–policy–practice interface recog-
nised the wider political utility of DSTs, in
particular relating to two aspects: their abil-
ity to defend decisions from counterclaims
and the stability they create for decision
making. While innovation in ideas, processes
and practice was widely valued, it was clear
that there was a perception of risk, whether
concerning the resource demands of devel-
oping new knowledge, time delays or even
the risk of incorporating evidence with a less
demonstrable track record. For example,
workshop participants discussed how coun-
cils need to invest in data to justify and
defend new policy initiatives or disrupt exist-
ing ways of doing and knowing, but that the
costs, lack of capacity and uncertain value
propositions inhibit this.
‘We are in a world of proof and proof is
numbers’: Selecting, reducing and
integrating
Issues of selectivity bring into focus the
types of knowledge generated, relative value
between competing knowledge claims, and
the relations between those who produce the
data and those who consider it. In this
regard, interviewees identified a clear prefer-
ence for generating and considering quanti-
tative knowledge within planning decisions
that, while providing stability and standardi-
sation, may exclude aspects of planning that
either have a less long-standing calculative
tradition or are connected to more qualita-
tive approaches. For example:
It’s partly how we measured things in the past,
and it’s easy to count things and harder to make
qualitative assessments. We are in a world of
proof and proof is numbers . there will be this
reliance on what appears to be a numerically
extreme prediction 30 years into the future of
what will happen in a network, which just looks
accurate and gains a plausibility which you just
can’t justify. (Local Government 1)
Similarly, Modeller 3 identified the power of
traditional institutional and policy settings
when he recalled asking traffic engineers
whether they included cycle use and was told
that they did not as ‘We’re not Amsterdam’.
A recurring theme linked the generation of
knowledge with agency, specifically that if
data are not collected then certain outcomes
are less likely. An example of an attempt to
form a new association between actants to
mitigate this was research aiming to quantify
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the value of walking in order to enable a
more pedestrian-focused public realm. The
authors get to the heart of the perceived bias
in rigour towards quantification and auto-
oriented transport in their subtitle: ‘You
have to count walkability to make walking
count’ (Davis and Golly, 2017). A number
of other interviews mentioned how more
subjective aspects such as design, place or
even indigenous knowledge are captured less
often and are more silent in comparison. As
Modeller 1 put it:
[we know] Maori information is lacking, and
we always push it aside, and just note that this
is lacking . Quite often we focus on the
easiest because we have the data, not actually
what is most important, or what matters most
to people or communities.
Moreover, it was demonstrated how the
careful caveats and probability ranges of
modellers become selectively reduced as they
transition to the Mayor’s desk. While DSTs
are commonly seen as a valuable simplifica-
tion of reality, the realities of politics push
this into more problematic territory that
prizes reductionism and certainty, and may
put DSTs under pressure to evidence a claim
or issue that they were not designed to.
if I present a range of outcomes, decision mak-
ers don’t like it. They want to see a single out-
come that is predicted. (Modeller 2)
There’s always the expectation amongst deci-
sion makers, be they elected members or senior
management or whoever, who don’t under-
stand the limitations of the model and think
that . you can ask the model 12 questions
when it’s only been designed to answer three.
(Modeller 3)
Models built for one purpose will be picked
up . then all of a sudden it’s being used to
look at [something else]. That never was the
intended purpose and if you went back and
asked the model builder whether that should
happen or not they’re probably in tears and
reading all of their contracts to make sure
they’re not legally liable for any of these kind
of things. (Modeller 5)
A further aspect that develops the discussion
of selectivity and relations between actants is
the integration between models. Taking the
example of population projections and infra-
structure it would be expected that these
should relate closely to each other, but in
two major cities the data revealed this was
not the case, leading to a shortfall in infra-
structure investment. In Hamilton, infra-
structure projections were set to ‘low’ while
population models indicated ‘high’ was the
most likely scenario, which was later proved
accurate. This selective political decision
meant household rates were set lower but
under a new administration the infrastruc-
ture deficit became apparent, which contrib-
uted to a sharp 9.7% rise to help pay for
growth and manage emerging unaffordabil-
ity concerns (Modeller 1). Similarly, the
Auckland Plan (Operative 2012) had its pop-
ulation projections set to ‘high’ but infra-
structure projections were set lower to
prevent infrastructure surpluses. The 2017
plan refresh, combined with growth that
exceeded even the high projections, brought
the effects of this policy to light and now
they are closely aligned (Advocate 1). This
emphasises how selectivities occur between,
as well as within models, and highlights the
importance of transparency, an issue we
now turn to.
Opening up the black box:
Complexity, scrutiny and
democracy
The research revealed that the rise in data
volume and complexity, the huge profits
made from development and the rise of a
more epistemic culture all contribute to a
black box effect. The quotes below highlight
a consistent view that – particularly for
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significant planning issues – the financial
costs of participation combined with the
expertise needed to understand data or pro-
duce counterclaims in an evidential system
have implications for professional scrutiny
and the ability to transition to alternative
ways of knowing and doing.
The volume [of evidence] has gone up, the
complexity has certainly gone up, the whole
legal and evidential base has ramped up
hugely in the last decade . there is such a
power imbalance because an applicant clearly
wants an outcome of a decision and is pre-
pared to pay for that, submitters, neighbours
or community groups who are not well funded
simply cannot afford to contest it in the way it
needs to be contested in an evidential system.
(Independent Hearing Commissioner 1)
17 years ago you’d go through a big develop-
ment application, the hearing would be done
in a day, the applicant would spend 2 or
3 hours putting their case forward. Not a lot
of evidence. Submitters would come along
speak for 10 minutes, leave. Now our submit-
ters have lawyers, our submitters have plan-
ners. It becomes a paper war . If you’re an
average mum and dad, you are completely
bamboozled by the whole process. (Local
Government 2)
The following quotes also reveal how data
resist peer review and possible counterclaims
as their complexity increases and, as a conse-
quence, scrutiny becomes increasingly deliv-
ered by experts in hearings rather than by
planners in local authorities who may not
have the capacity to interrogate the termi-
nology, methods and assumptions. In a
number of cases it took moments of legal
disagreement or public controversy from
expert counterclaims to render these issues
visible.
It certainly left me with a real concern that we
were placing a large reliance on the outputs
from these models and making huge decisions
long term around network changes and expen-
diture. I think the decision makers just assume
there’s a high level of rigour going on behind
the scenes . if it’s not your thing, it’s pretty
easy to leave it to the experts to get on with it.
(Planner 1)
[during the hearing] it became evident that the
model that the council was using and what
opponents and others were using, was the
same [but] they all had different understand-
ings of the terminology and assumptions . so
they were all coming up with different out-
comes. (Independent Hearing Commissioner 1)
There is much research on the characteristics
of good decision making, where issues such
as transparency or independent peer review
are mentioned. The data show this is diffi-
cult to achieve in some cases because of how
data are owned. Modellers and planners
both observed a rising commercialisation of
DSTs within the consultancy sector, outlin-
ing how hard it is to get access to the data
and assumptions and open up the black
box or compile counterclaims. For instance,
Modeller 4 states:
It can’t happen, because commercial models
will never open their black box . You can
have peer review with non-disclosure agree-
ments, but at the same time that’s not the level
of transparency I would be looking for.
Additionally, Modeller 1 argued that the rela-
tively small size of New Zealand and the evi-
dential nature of its planning system lends
itself vulnerable to ‘expert capture’, where one
side secures the services of experts to both
defend their position and help close the black
box by preventing their expertise being avail-
able for counterclaims. Interviewees pointed
out the need for open access protocols that
enable more scrutiny and peer review, as well
as a better understanding of the caveats and
weight to be assigned. As Independent
Hearing Commissioner 3 argued:
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I don’t think there is enough investigation of
models, whether it’s traffic modelling, employ-
ment or whatever, in getting under the bonnet
and understanding what assumptions have
been made that have fed into the model,
because unless you fully understand and
appreciate those you run the risk of rubbish
going in the model and rubbish coming out.
This discussion not only has consequences
for practitioners, it also has implications for
the ability to transition to other planning
goals. To challenge in this epistemic culture
you need to understand evidence, analyse
and produce your own interpretation, and
possibly even procure your own science and
experts. Yet, the central importance of
DSTs for evidence-based decision making,
combined with the rise in data complexity
and the difficulty for non-experts to open up
the ‘black box’ for scrutiny favours those
with the existing calculative agency or the
resources to obtain it. It is worth noting that
checks and balances were conducted, but the
ability to scrutinise is uneven and requires
investment or existing expertise.
Human and non-human agency:
Making a stable world
The discussion helps foreground how non-
human entities, such as DSTs, form associa-
tions with actors to modify decisions in ways
that may not otherwise have happened.
There was a widespread perception amongst
participants of a degree of Barnesian perfor-
mativity, where actants collectively usher
into being the future that is predicted. First,
the history and power of traffic modelling
was repeatedly cited as a constitutive force
on urban environments, creating auto depen-
dency, homogeneity and over-engineered
road widths resulting from a strong calcula-
tive tradition associated with travel time sav-
ings for automobile travel. Interviewees did
flag an attempt to shift the institutional
settings since the change in Government in
2017 to include other modes of travel, such
as cycling, but also emphasised the power of
the status quo, the stable decision-making
environment, and the path dependencies
already created. This is not the fault of mod-
ellers or DSTs, it appears to be more a func-
tion of the institutional settings that generate
stability and the ‘world-making’ power
afforded to calculative rationality.
if you talk about tools that we tend to be using
currently, firstly they’re largely predicated by
an almost concealed assumption that traffic
flow and the speed of traffic flow takes prece-
dence over any other consideration . and
that has significant implications for both place
quality and the functioning of places. (Local
Government 1)
If you only measure transport in cars, travel
counts, and journeys with cars, then that’s what
you get and that’s what you design for.
Therefore, your cars go into those designed
roads, because that’s what you did. (Modeller 1)
The thing that we do classically wrong with
models, is predict and provide. We look at
what the black box tells us and then we pro-
vide it, and that induces the future that it pre-
dicts. (Local Government 3)
A further insight into how institutional and
policy settings, rather than the DSTs, may
have performative power is revealed when
considering the incremental effects of siloed
decisions. For example, a number of inter-
viewees mentioned that development pro-
posals may require minimum car parking
provisions, which is logical when considering
individual planning applications, but from a
cumulative perspective has a negative effect
on the public realm, such as for building
design or the viability of shifts to other
modes of transport.
I’ve worked with architects for decades and
they will all say, ‘the first thing that has to hap-
pen is we’ve got to accommodate 300 cars on
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the site, we have to go to a traffic engineer and
they have to approve this traffic plan’. And
that has a direct influence on the form of the
building. (Advocate 2)
between your churches, your pubs, and your
supermarkets, they all require a level of car
parking. But, if you add all of those assump-
tions together you end up with the whole
CBD as a parking lot and you’ve really got no
ability to develop the CBD. (Workshop
Participant)
The next performative power highlighted
was that, generally speaking, infill or CBD
development was perceived to be more diffi-
cult to gain planning consent for than green-
field development, in part because of
calculative traditions concerning what costs
are included. The wider implications of these
tendencies are well known, encompassing
issues as wide ranging as poor travel options,
obesity, CO2 emissions, fuel poverty, high
costs for new infrastructure and the need to
regenerate ‘hollowed out’ CBDs.
the rule book is predisposed to greenfield
development . It doesn’t see land as the
problem on the outskirts. It’s just the way it is.
(Planner 2)
[Take the example of] greenfield development in
a developing area, where the background traffic
was very light, but it generated a lot of trips .
[this] requires very little mitigation. The contrary
case is a brownfield development in an urban
core area where there’s quite a high level of
background traffic already, you may get this
cumulative effect where development, even
though it generates fewer trips per capita, will
put the background network to a level of perfor-
mance that’s considered unacceptable, therefore
this development will be required to mitigate all
of the impacts. (Local Government 1)
You build first where it’s cheapest, and that’s
usually in the greenfield. If you don’t interna-
lise the social costs, the costs of infrastructure,
of water, of waste, of energy. (Modeller 1)
An important final issue is the political
power of ideological spatial imaginaries,
which have become standardised within
institutional and policy settings. For
instance, the number of DSTs discussed in
the brief quote below reveals how, over time,
actants align and stabilise a particular con-
ception of urban form.
Over the last decade, having cities connected
by large state highways or motorways has
been a desire irrespective of the evidence base
to support those outcomes. So, you can ask
questions of transport models with regards to
travel time benefits, vehicle operating costs,
emission safety. You can do the calculations
. and follow the economic evaluation manual
through the investment assessment framework
and get answers which give you good benefit
cost ratios, etc. You can get strategic align-
ment if your strategy is to build motorways.
(Modeller 5)
This section links the critique of planning,
such as with regard to the type of places
created and the ability to change in
response, with epistemological, ideological
and relational concerns. Within the calcu-
lative culture of New Zealand planning the
examples appear to highlight the power of
DSTs, particularly concerning the location
and type of development, or the ways citi-
zens travel. Readers can better understand,
for instance, why New Zealand has one of
the highest rates of light vehicle ownership
(cars, vans, SUVs and utility vehicles) in
the world, with 792 per 1000 of population,
a growth of 23% over the last decade
(Ministry of Transport, 2018). We should,
however, exercise caution in assigning
causality. For example, do models respond
to the demands of existing spatial patterns,
or indeed the aspirations of politicians and
public concerning their preferred mode of




Reflections on DSTs, stability
and change
Planning researchers and practitioners are
all too familiar with the critiques of the pro-
fession and the perennial pressure to pro-
duce better outcomes in more efficient ways.
It should be noted that the stakes are high
and there was widespread dissatisfaction
with the practices and outcomes of planning.
Within New Zealand, the governmental and
public critique has been concerned with
poorly functioning cities (e.g. congestion), a
lack of integration (e.g. more spatial strate-
gies) and the high cost of housing, which is
amongst the least affordable in the world
(Edmunds, 2019; New Zealand Productivity
Commission, 2017). The urgency of debate
is encapsulated by a new Ministry of
Housing and Urban Development created in
late 2018 to help make ‘housing more
affordable and our cities more liveable’
(New Zealand Government, 2018: 1) and the
recently announced intention to ‘compre-
hensively overhaul the RMA’ (New Zealand
Government, 2019).
One value of an STS perspective is that it
helps shift critical attention away from pol-
icy or the balance between public and pri-
vate actors, to instead rest upon wider issues
connected to the epistemic culture and the
relations between human and non-human
actors. Although discussion of this rela-
tional-actants approach may make it more
difficult to provide policy ‘fixes’, by exten-
sion it also brings to light the danger in
oversimplifying causality or seeing DSTs as
only having non-human power when they
are constructed by layers of social processes.
For example, this research emphasises how
actants combine to produce stability and, by
extension, facilitates a different view of the
difficulties associated with systemic change.
This relates to the production of knowledge,
the selective way knowledge claims are
assigned value and voice, and how their
world-making ability crystallises over time.
Put differently, the empirical sections reveal
a tension between intrinsic human ambitions
to achieve settled and objective states of the
world, such as with regard to the develop-
ment process, and the changing and subjec-
tive expectations people have of the places
they live. It is a given that there is value in
repetition, not least for efficiency and cer-
tainty, but where there are significant calls
for planning reform the wider epistemic cul-
ture and the ways actants align to provide
stability should be recast as aspects of criti-
cal attention.
This perspective helps us appreciate not
just why change is hard, but also the kinds
of culture and practices that need to be fos-
tered in response. It was clear that the long-
standing practices of planning fostered
established relations between human and
non-human actants, which served to open
up and stabilise particular kinds of planning
discourses, close other arguments and assign
value selectivity. Insights into the epistemic
culture also provided insights into why
quasi-scientific technical terms such as
rigour, testability or ‘track records’ are
deemed important and why DSTs provide
valuable roles relating to inuring to profes-
sional and institutional risk. The high profile
of concerns relating to counterclaims and
liability served to create a degree of self-
regulation where decision makers sought to
balance the protection of their reputational
capital with more emergent but risky ideas.
The empirical sections discussed how
DSTs did not just help order development
options, they also provided a hierarchy
between actors and agencies. For example,
institutions with a longer history of calcula-
tive competency and access to technical
resources had a powerful position stabilised
by established actant relations in compari-
son with more qualitative, normative and
emergent agendas, such as relating to
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quality, indigenous knowledge or walkabil-
ity. While these issues did have voice, it was
acknowledged that the epistemic culture
helped foster an uneven playing field where
norms of public judgements and institu-
tional practice categorised knowledge into
differing spaces of calculative competence.
We can now better appreciate how rigour can
stray into rigour mortis, how stability can be
both positive and negative, and the challenges
in normative shifts from a calculative ration-
ality to more ambiguous and disordered mat-
ters such as justice, quality or liveability.
The political dimensions of DSTs
stretched beyond their value to order com-
plexity, to reveal a bias towards a preferred
truth that has its roots in an ideological
vision of urban form. This is less about the
influence of models as such, but more about
the way that long-held scientific ways of see-
ing align to provide a stable set of relations
that legitimises and mainstreams an imagin-
ary that some interviewees argued runs
counter to aspects such as liveability or sus-
tainability. Their attempts to develop coun-
terclaims were affected by a black box effect
and the costs associated in championing
knowledge deemed emergent, less rigorous
or lacking a calculative tradition and track
record. As a consequence of the increase in
complexity, advocates in particular claimed
the balance has subtly shifted towards tech-
nocratic elites with the requisite resources,
as has been observed elsewhere (e.g. Rydin,
2007). Even relatively well-resourced local
authority actors complained of the costs and
uncertain investment propositions of com-
piling evidence to justify shifts in practice.
More fundamentally, an application of an
STS lens to planning leads us to some inter-
esting discussions regarding performativity.
It should be recognised that DSTs in plan-
ning are designed to be performative; data
should modify behaviour, that is the point.
Within planning, non-human actants, such
as policies or DSTs have agency and always
will. If a plan is enacted it is self-fulfilling
and deemed a success, but in contrast to eco-
nomic models, it is designed for that pur-
pose. As such, planning may not be prone to
the level of performativity that some inter-
viewees suggest, but rather, inherently prone
to accusations of it. Long-held professional
terminology such as ‘decisions should be
made in accordance with the plan’ promotes
a culture where non-human objects are given
agency to modify human behaviour, but this
also presents a potential risk of abdicating
professional judgement and planning by
technical proxy. From a planning perspec-
tive, the question is not just whether it is per-
formative or not. It is rather about first,
examining their normative underlying pre-
suppositions that seek to categorise the
world. Second, considering whether the epis-
temic culture affords differing forms of
rationality the correct agency. And third,
analysing how easy it is for more emergent
agendas to advance counterclaims, open up
alternative discourses, and facilitate systemic
changes if desired.
While all models are wrong there is no
doubt they are incredibly useful. All intervie-
wees acknowledged that data and rigour are
staples of good decisions, without which we
would struggle to make sense of phenomena,
understand options and communicate infor-
mation. Further, the research also showed
that in many cases the process is working
well; DSTs were tested and calibrated, scru-
tiny and weight assigned, and planning deliv-
ered outcomes that many were happy with.
It was, however, apparent that the relatively
litigious and epistemic planning regime in
place, combined with the high financial
stakes of development, fosters a decision-
making culture that is data hungry, prizes
stability and certainty, and suggests a need
to more easily open up black boxes or create
safer spaces for innovation.
If urban aspirations and preferences are
subject to a growing degree of technological
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mediation we can say that planners need to
understand that calculations matter, not
because of their accuracy or objectivity, but
because of how they represent forces of sta-
bility that may run counter to more dynamic
and diverse societal expectations. As such,
the data help unsettle the planner and plan-
ning policy as the key agent determining
planning outcomes, which is instead revealed
as more contingent on the political, institu-
tional and professional culture and the
diverse array of technical tools that combine
to create stable frameworks for decision
making. It also helps provide a fuller under-
standing of the perennial criticism of plan-
ning as a system and why, without a stronger
critical focus on the relationship between sci-
ence, policy and practice, more data will not
necessarily equate to better outcomes.
Calculations will always be of central
value for planning, but with rigour comes
the risk of rigour mortis; a stability and cer-
tainty that maintains the power of estab-
lished calculative agencies and replicates
similar outcomes. Theories of, and in, plan-
ning often refer to noticeable shifts in ration-
ality, such as towards communicative
planning or the current movement in many
countries to be more market-enabling. Yet,
associated with this trend has been the wide-
spread adoption and integration of rational-
calculative devices that are a staple of eco-
nomic agency and behaviour. Their wider
influence, however, suggests that planning
and urban researchers should reflect upon
the role of DSTs not just as ‘truth-seeking’
but as potentially ‘place-making’ forces that
provide internal stability when there are
external calls for change. Indeed, the relative
neglect of planning scholars to consider the
ways by which the calculative practices
shape decisions and outcomes is striking
when considered in the context of the shift
to evidence-based planning that runs analo-
gous to much critique. Moreover, the range
of issues identified provides an indication of
the richness of epistemic cultures and calcu-
lative rationalities as core objects of plan-
ning enquiry. A key recurring question for
planning research is how do we enable a cul-
ture that is more facilitative to innovation
and emergent knowledge, while retaining the
evidence-based system that will always be a
part of planning?
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